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INTRODUCTION

2
Nonprofit organizations' have been the neglected stepchildren
of modern organization law. The law historically has given nonprofit
organizations, like Cinderellas, the hand-me-downs of their half-siblings, the business organizations. This pattern, however, is changing.
Recent growth in the economic power of nonprofit organizations, 3 as

I

Statutory formulations contain diverse definitions of the term "nonprofit organization."

Broadly defined, a nonprofit organization is one that is not operated for the personal-financial
benefit of its members. Thus, a nonprofit organization may not pay dividends to its members.
Members may, however, extract benefits from nonprofit organizations. For instance, employee-members of such organizations often receive substantial compensation for their services.
Moreover, members of certain noncharitable nonprofit organizations (such as automobile
clubs) may receive part of the corporations' assets upon dissolution in addition to other benefits

of membership. See Ellman, On Developing a Law of Nonprofit Corporations, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J.
153, 154.
2 Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22 Bus. LAW. 951
(1967).
3 The membership rolls of nonprofit organizations have swelled in recent years. A recent
report of about 240 religious institutions noted a total of over 131 million members. See Oleck,
Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 962, 965 (1979). The wealth of
nonprofit organizations is similarly staggering. American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel
statistics reveal that contributions in 1980 totaled $47.7 billion, compared with $19.2 billion in
1970. Id. at 967; "Gifts to Nonprofit Groups Rise to a Record but Lag Behind Inflation,"
N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 1.
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well as the ascendency of the nonprofit organization as an important
alternative form of commercial enterprise,4 have spawned significant
legislation in the field.'
This Article traces the historical development of nonprofit organization law in view of the traditional dominance of business organization law. Next, general principles for the ideal nonprofit corporation statute are outlined. The Article then discusses and evaluates the
major nonprofit organization statutes: the ABA Model Non-Profit
Corporation Act," the Delaware General Corporation Law,' the New
York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law,' Professor Howard L. Oleck's
proposed Uniform Nonprofit Organizations Act,9 and the recent California Nonprofit Corporation Law.'
Despite their shortcomings,
these statutes represent considerable progress in the development of a
coherent body of law that deals specifically with the unique and varied
problems of nonprofit organizations.
I
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NONPROFIT
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

Business corporations have not always occupied the center of
organization law. Unincorporated nonprofit organizations prevailed
centuries before the development of business organizations. Indeed,
business organizations originally patterned themselves after such nonprofit groups as public, religious, charitable, and educational unincorporated and incorporated organizations."
Early common law recognized three types of nonprofit organizations: unincorporated nonprofit associations, charitable trusts, and

4 See Ellman, supra note 1 at 153-54 (discussing ascendency of nonprofit corporations that
perform services for their members, but shun the profit form, such as Educational Testing

Service and Master Charge).
5 See generally H. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS
54-62 (4th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as OLECK DRAFT]. Professor Oleck notes that "[e]very
state provides some system of basic classifications of nonprofit organizations. Some . . . are
elaborate and precise, while some are so rudimentary as to be of little practical value." Id. at

44.
6 ABA-ALI MODEL NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT (1964).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (1975 & Supp. 1980).
8 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 101-1515 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1981) [here-

7

inafter cited as N-PCL]. This Article discusses the New York statute in the most detail to
indicate those subjects a comprehensive nonprofit corporation statute should cover. Only the
unique aspects of the other statutes are discussed in detail.
' OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5, at 1187-1221.
'0 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-10,846 (West Supp.

1981).

11 See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES 13-14 (2d. 1970).
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nonprofit corporations. Early courts applied the law governing nonprofit organizations to the commercial enterprises that subsequently
developed. Consequently, emerging commercial organizations such as
joint stock companies, Massachusetts or business trusts, and business
or stock corporations were subject to similar rules.12 Unincorporated
organizations were governed primarily by agency law and, by analogy, partnership principles; trusts were governed by the law of
trusts-both areas rich in fiduciary concepts. With little statutory
support, courts applied analogous legal and equitable principles to
incorporated organizations. Nonprofit corporations originally obtained special charters from the Crown or successive sovereign powers
such as the state legislatures in the United States. This special legislation provided the foundation upon which business corporation char13
ters and general incorporation statutes were later based.
II
PRECEDENCE OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW

The industrial revolution precipitated the development of business organizations, which soon dominated the economy and have
since preoccupied organization law.' 4 Courts routinely have decided
cases involving nonprofit groups on common law and equitable principles originally developed to solve the problems of business organizations.1 5 The organized bar has nurtured the law of business organizations at the state and federal levels. Practicing lawyers and bar
associations have litigated business organization issues and have
drafted and lobbied for business legislation."
With the exception of
Professor Oleck, law teachers have demonstrated little interest in
nonprofit organizations. Law schools infrequently offer courses on the
subject, and the relevant legal literature is largely confined to the tax

12 Large overseas trading companies also developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Many of these were organized as joint stock companies and were closely linked to
their national governments. See id. at 14-16.
13 See generally id. at 13-18.
14 General incorporation enabling statutes replaced the special charter incorporation proce-

dures. These general incorporation statutes became more lenient as states competed
business incorporations. Id. at 19-20. See notes 70-75 and accompanying text infra.
organization legislation has covered partnerships, limited partnerships, and business
tions. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT;
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT;

ABA-ALI

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT

for local
Business
corporaREVISED

(1978).

15 See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (applying business
corporation rules on director self-dealing to charitable corporation).
" For a discussion of the widespread influence of the Model Business Corporation Act, see
notes 33-35 and accompanying text infra.
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aspects of nonprofit organizations and constitutional issues of church
and state that arise in connection with religious nonprofit institutions.
Nonprofit corporations currently are regulated by myriad statutory formulations. Some jurisdictions, for example, have general corporation statutes, governing both profit and nonprofit corporations,
which contain a few sections applicable only to nonprofit corporations.1 7 Other jurisdictions have enacted separate business corporation and nonprofit corporation statutes.18 Still other statutory formulations are so scattered as to defy classification. Statutory and
decisional treatment of unincorporated nonprofit groups in many
jurisdictions is far from satisfactory. 9
III
IDEAL NONPROFIT CORPORATION STATUTE

Nonprofit corporation statutes generally should resemble business corporation statutes inasmuch as they both govern the formation,
financial and management structures, operation, regulation, and dissolution of corporations. The ideal nonprofit corporation statute,
the essential
however, should be modified where appropriate to reflect
20
differences between nonprofit and profit organizations.
A. Drafting Considerations
Because the motives behind corporate organization range from
pure altruism to unabashed cupidity, drafters of nonprofit corporation
statutes should understand thoroughly the purposes of nonprofit corporations. Thus, they should have similar backgrounds, experiences,
and attitudes as organizers of nonprofit corporations. One statute
covering both profit and nonprofit corporations can hardly satisfy
corsuch needs; nor can separate business corporation and nonprofit
21
poration statutes if drafted under the same sponsorship.
17
18

See, e.g.,
See, e.g.,

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (1975 & Supp. 1980).
§§ 100-2319 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981) (business corpora-

CAL. CORP. CODE

tions); id. §§ 5000-10,846 (nonprofit corporations); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 101-2001
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981) (business corporations); N-PCL, supra note 8, §§ 101-1515
(nonprofit corporations); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1978); ABA-ALI MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1964).
19See Payne, UnincorporatedAssociations Trends, in ABA-ALI, TRENDS IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS LAW 31 (1977).
20 See notes 87-90 and accompanying text infra.
2' The ABA Corporate Laws Committee was responsible for both the Model Non-Profit
Corporation Act and the Model Business Corporation Act. See Preface to ABA-ALI MODEL
NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT at vii-viii (1964); Foreword to ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
(1978).
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Furthermore, statutory treatment of nonprofit corporations
should reflect the fact that even nonprofit corporations vary in their
degree of altruism. Nonprofit organizations may be created for mutual benefit, public benefit, religious purposes, or countless other
reasons. To accommodate best such varying purposes, the ideal nonprofit corporation statute should be flexible with respect to financing,
membership, duties and liabilities of the board of directors, external
supervision, and distribution of assets upon dissolution of the organization. Thus, a nonprofit corporation statute should provide for some
general classification of nonprofit corporations in accordance with
22
corporate purposes.
Although incorporated and unincorporated nonprofit organizations may have similar purposes, traditional thinking treats the former
as a fictitious legal entity or person and the latter as an aggregate of
persons. One statute covering both types of organizations would require considerable delineation of the legal principles that govern the
unincorporated nonprofit organization. A preferable alternative
would be a Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act, under the sponsorship of the National Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.

23

B. Desiderata
What, then, are the desiderata of a nonprofit corporation statute?
Permissible corporate purposes should be nonpecuniary and nonbusiness, and there should be no opportunity for amending, merging,
consolidating, or otherwise amalgamating for other purposes.2 4 Cor' See notes 241-45 and accompanying text infra. Professor Henry B. Hansmann recently
criticized statutory attempts to classify nonprofit corporations according to corporate purposes.
See Hansmann, Rforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 580-94 (1981).
Professor Hansmann correctly points out that the classification schemes contain various ambiguities regarding the criteria for classification. These ambiguities, however, have posed few
practical problems. Nonprofit incorporators have generally been able to identify the classification which suits their corporate purposes. The N-PCL, for example, has been in place for
eleven years and there are no significant cases involving disputes over classification of a
nonprofit corporation. Professor Hansmann's main concern is that such ambiguities will
permit evasion of the rule against distributions to members. 129 U. PA. L. REv. at 580-94. He
proposes a unitary nonprofit statute with rigid prohibitions on distributions to members.
Mutual benefit organizations would be required to form under the statute governing cooperative corporations. Id. The proposal presents significant economic and practical problems in
view of the number of mutual benefit groups currently using the nonprofit corporation form.
His approach would also require reform of cooperative statutes. It would be preferable to deal
with this problem by modifying provisions dealing with distributions and dissolution. See, e.g.,
notes 169-72 infra.
I The Uniform Partnership, Uniform Limited Partnership, and Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Acts are not very helpful for unincorporated nonprofit organizations. For a
discussion of this problem see notes 185-92 and accompanying text infra.
v See notes 165-68 and accompanying text infra.
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poration statutes should be enabling, thus permitting incorporation
without excessive regulation. Yet some governmental supervision of
both unincorporated and incorporated nonprofit organizations is essential. These needs may be addressed in one statute or through
enabling legislation applicable only to nonprofit corporations and
25
supervisory legislation applicable to all nonprofit organizations.
Membership and board of directors provisions should reflect
varying organizational purposes.2 ' The statute governing nonprofit
organizations should allow different classes of members, institutional
members, and no members, with provision for performance of member functions by others in the latter situation.2 7 In addition, there
must be adequate provision for the selection of directors, express
delineation of their management functions and duties, and limits on
self-dealing and compensation. Where management other than by the
board of directors is desirable, the statute should permit delegation of
authority to committees and alternate managing bodies.
The degree of internal stewardship and governmental regulation,
including attorney general supervision, also should vary depending on
corporate purpose. Member derivative actions, similar actions by
directors, officers, and others, and intracorporate procedures may
provide adequate internal stewardship. 2 8 Governmental regulation
should not be unduly burdensome and should be performed by as few
governmental bodies as possible.2 9 Judicial regulation should be limited to the traditional visitatorial power of courts of equity in addition
to the judicial functions commonly associated with the resolution of
legal disputes.
Provisions pertaining to the administration of assets should be
consistent with the conditions and limitations applicable to donated
assets, whether from public or private sources. Upon dissolution, and
after satisfaction of all creditors' claims, net assets should be distributed according to applicable conditions and limitations, including the
cy pres doctrine. 30 The disposition of any remaining assets should
depend on the stated organizational purposes and the principle
against profits inuring to the benefit of members, as set forth in the
articles of incorporation under the controlling statute.3 1

See notes
See notes
27 See notes
28 See notes
29 See notes
30 See notes
31 See notes
2
28

185-92 and accompanying text infra.
141-43 and accompanying text infra.
199-200 and accompanying text infra.
267-74 and accompanying text infra.
257-66 and accompanying text infra.
133-40 and accompanying text infra.
48-52, 169-72 and accompanying text infra.
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A nonprofit corporation conducting activities within a state
should not be able to circumvent the state's nonprofit corporation laws
simply by incorporating in another jurisdiction. In such situations, the
corporation should be required to qualify as a foreign corporation
before it can commence in-state activities. The statute also should
provide for assimilation so that foreign corporations with substantial
local contacts are subject to certain provisions applicable to domestic
nonprofit corporations .32
IV
ABA MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION ACT

The American Bar Association Corporate Laws Committee has
drafted model acts dealing separately with profit and nonprofit corporations. The two model acts, the Model Business Corporation Act 33
and the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, 34 reflect the prevailing
concern for business corporations.
The Corporate Laws Committee first published the Model Business Corporation Act in 1950. The Act subsequently was revised
every few years and has undergone annual revision since 1973. The
Model Business Corporation Act has attracted considerable attention
from the corporate bar and different versions of it have been substantially adopted in one-quarter of American jurisdictions . 5
The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act3

6

first appeared in 1952

under the same auspices as the Model Business Corporation Act. A
newly created Committee on Non-Profit Corporations revised the Act
in 1957 and again in 1965.1 7 The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act
"follows as closely as permitted by the difference in subject matter the
corresponding provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act as
supplemented and modified by the 1964 Addendum." ' 38 In contrast
to the Model Business Corporation Act's frequent revisions, the
Model Non-Profit Corporation Act remains substantially unchanged
since it was first published. Although many of the changes made to the
Model Business Corporation Act are equally germane to nonprofit

3

See notes 173-180 and accompanying text infa.

33 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1978).
ABA-ALI MODEL NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT (1964). The ABA currently is revising the
Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, but the text of the revision is unavailable.
'- See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. (West Supp. 1977).
36 ABA-ALI MODEL NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT (1964).
" See OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5, at 1189.
38 Preface to ABA-ALI MODEL NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT at vii-viii (1964).
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corporations, 39 the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act has not incorporated them.
The principal strengths of the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act
lie in its organization and well-drafted sections, modeled after its
business corporation predecessor. Although permissible corporate
purposes are broadly defined, 40 the Act does not contain a classification scheme. No distinction is made among mutual benefit, public
benefit, and religious corporations despite their different financial and
management structures and need for varying degrees of internal and
41
external supervision.
The Act, which defines a nonprofit corporation as "a corporation
no part of the income or profit of which is distributable to its members, directors or officers," ' 42 prohibits the issuance of stock or dividends. 43 There may be one or more classes of members or no members.44 The articles of incorporation or bylaws set standards for the
election of directors. 45 The Act provides that the board of directors
manage corporate affairs but contains no express provision for alternative arrangements allowing greater membership control. 46 The
Act also requires foreign nonprofit corporations to qualify before
4
conducting local activities. 1
Upon dissolution of the corporation and satisfaction of creditors'
claims, the Act provides for distribution of assets as follows: (1) return
to the donor of assets held on condition requiring return; 48 (2) transfer
of assets subject to limitations permitting their use only for specific
nonprofit purposes to another nonprofit organization having a purpose similar to that of the dissolving corporation; 49 (3) distribution to
9 See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1978) (duties of directors revised in
1974).
40 ABA-ALI MODEL NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT § 4 (1964) states:

Corporations may be organized under this Act for any lawful purpose or
purposes, including, without being limited to, any one or more of the following
purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; civic; patriotic; political; religious; social; fraternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scientific; agricultural;
horticultural; animal husbandry; and professional, commercial, industrial or trade
association; but labor unions, cooperative organizations, and organizations subject
to any of the provisions of the insurance laws of this State may not be organized
under this Act.
41 See notes 246-66 and accompanying text infa. The Model Business Corporation Act, on
which the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act is based, intends that other statutes will regulate
the corporation's activities. Preface to ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT at xi (1953).
" ABA-ALI MODEL NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT § 2(c) (1964).

43 Id. §
44 Id. §
45 Id. §
46 Id. §
47 Id. §
48 Id. §
4. Id. §

26.
11.
18.
17.
63.
46(b).
46(c).
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the dissolving corporation's members or others as provided for in its
articles of incorporation or bylaws; 50 or (4) distribution to such persons or organizations as the plan of distribution specifies. 5' The
dissolving corporation may thus distribute net assets resulting from
accumulated income or profits to its members, directors, or officers
upon dissolution despite the no-dividend requirement, because such
distributions are not "deemed to be a dividend or a distribution of
52
income or profit."
In sum, the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act lacks the necessary classification scheme, does not sufficiently provide for more active membership role in management, and may allow improper distribution of income upon dissolution of the nonprofit corporation.
Furthermore, the Act contains no provision for continuous governmental supervision, 53 director and officer liability,5 4 and member de55
rivative actions.
V
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW

Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, as revised in
1967, governs both nonprofit and profit corporations.5 6 Drafted to
encourage business incorporations in Delaware, the statute applies to
any corporation formed "to conduct or promote any lawful business
or purposes." 5 7 Moreover, the use of the term "conduct of affairs"
instead of "transacting business" or "management of business"
58
makes the statute easily applicable to nonprofit corporations.
The Delaware statute provides no classification scheme for the
various types of nonprofit corporations although it does contain special provisions that apply to private foundations59 and the conferment
of academic or honorary degrees. 0 Although most provisions of the
statute refer to stockholders as such, specific provisions exist that
permit the certificate of incorporation to control member activity."

50Id. § 46(d).

5, Id. § 46(e).
52 Id. § 26.

5 See notes 257-66
r See notes 141-56
5' See notes 267-79
5 DEL. CODE ANN.
-1 Id. § 101(b).
58 Id. § 141.
59 Id. § 127.
60 Id. § 125.
61 Id. § 102(b)(1).

and
and
and
tit.

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
8, §§ 101-398

text infra.
text infra.
text infra.
(1975 & Supp. 1980).
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Members may adopt, repeal, or amend bylaws. 2 In addition, the
64
63
law provides for members' voting rights, quorum requirements,
proxies, 65 appraisal rights (equating members with stockholders of
business corporations), 6 dissolution of nonprofit corporations,6 7 and
renewal and amendment of certificates of incorporation of religious,
charitable, educational, and other nonprofit corporations .6 The statute expressly authorizes mergers and consolidations of profit and
69
nonprofit corporations.
In other respects, this most permissive of state corporation
statutes 70 applies without distinction to nonprofit corporations. The
Delaware statute permits nonprofit corporations, like business corporations, to operate with only one director 7 1 and the board of directors
manages the corporation except as otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation.72 The statute also provides for liberal fringe
benefits for directors and employees, 7 as well as indemnification of
directors and officers for liability arising out of their good faith actions
on behalf of the corporation.7 4
The 1967 revision of the original statute contributed little with
respect to nonprofit corporations. Indeed, the public policy underlying the revision, legislatively mandated in 1963, was "to maintain a
favorable business climate and to encourage corporations to make
Delaware their domicile." ' 75 Similarly, the revision commentaries,
"in the interest of brevity," made no attempt to call attention to
provisions of the law applicable only to nonprofit corporations.
The Delaware statute not only relies excessively on provisions
tailored to business corporations; it omits important features as well.
The statute fails to define a statutory standard of care for directors and
officers, and there is no provision for member derivative actions
except in the procedural rules. Therefore, common law and equitable

62
63

6

65
66
-

Id. § 109(a).
Id. § 215(c).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 262.
Id. § 276.

68 Id. § 313.

09Id. §§ 254-258.
See H. HENN, supra note 11, at 624 & n.51.
71 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1974 & Supp. 1980).
72 Id. § 141(a).
73 See id. § 122(15), (16).
70

- Id. § 145.

7- 54 Del. Laws ch. 218, at 724 (1963).
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principles govern such matters. Furthermore, no mechanism exists for
continuous supervision of nonprofit corporations. Clearly, Delaware
provides less than an ideal climate for nonprofit corporations.
VI
NEW YORK NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW OF

1970

New York enacted its Not-for-Profit Corporation Law 76 (NPCL) in 1969, and the law became effective on September 1, 1970.
Typical of the dominance of business corporation law, the N-PCL was
the last phase of a seventeen-year legislative program to update the
state's corporation statutes.7 7
A. Statutory Structure
The N-PCL was designed to parallel the New York Business
Corporation Law (BCL) 78 as closely as the subject matter permitted. 7' The N-PCL superseded the Membership Corporations Law
and replaced the General Corporation Law80 as the supporting statute
for the Religious Corporations Law, 8 the Benevolent Orders Law,82
and the Education Law,83 which the legislature retained with little
84
change.

76 N-PCL, supra note 8, §§ 101-1515. New York chose the unique phrase "not-for-profit"

because the legislators believed the term "nonprofit"

might be misconstrued to include

unprofitable business corporations. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF
CORPORATION LAWS, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA ON NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW iX
(McKinney 1970) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE MEMORANDA]. There is little basis for

the drafters' concern. Those familiar with the subject matter recognize readily the term
"nonprofit" and distinguish nonprofit corporations from unprofitable business corporations.
Later drafters have not followed the New York terminology.
17 Forewordto JOINT COMMITTEE MEMORANDA, supra note 76, at vii. The same joint committee responsible for the revised Business Corporation Law of 1963 drafted the N-PCL. Although

the joint committee relied on various consultants and advisory committees with expertise in
nonprofit corporations, it may have been preferable to delegate the drafting to a separate
committee. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.

18 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1-2001 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980).
79 See notes 87-90 and accompanying text infra.
80 Foreword to JOINT COMMITTEE MEMORANDA, supra note 76, at vii.
81 N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW §§ 2-b(1), (3) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
82 N.Y. BEN. ORD. LAW § 1-a (McKinney Supp. 1980).
81 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 216-a (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980); N-PCL § 103(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1980).
84 Prior to the 1970 legislation, New York classified corporations into three groups: (1)
public, (2) stock, and (3) non-stock. The statute further classified a non-stock corporation as
either a religious corporation, a membership corporation, or any corporation other than a stock
or public corporation. See N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 2, 3 (McKinney 1943).
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New York currently classifies corporations as: (1) public; (2)
corporations formed other than for profit; and (3) corporations formed
for profit. 85 Corporations formed other than for profit are further
classified as: (1) religious corporations; (2) education corporations; (3)
cooperative corporations; (4) not-for-profit corporations; and (5) 86any
other nonpublic corporation that is formed other than for profit.
The Joint Legislative Committee drafted the N-PCL using the
Business Corporation Law as a structural model . 7 The committee
desired both to draw upon the drafting expertise reflected in the BCL
and related business organization statutes and to enact a modern
statutory scheme governing nonprofit corporations. Special provisions
were, of course, included to address the special problems of nonprofit
corporations. 88 The organizational similarity between the two laws
facilitates use of the N-PCL by those already familiar with the slightly
older BCL.
For similar pragmatic reasons, the drafters of the N-PCL also
borrowed many definitions from the BCL.8 9 Again, it makes sense to
provide consistency between the two laws when the subject matter,
and indeed the terms employed, are identical. The N-PCL's similarity to the BCL therefore meets the criterion for the ideal formulation
that calls for similarity except when the nonprofit form mandates
otherwise. 9 °
B. Recognition of Nonprofit Diversity
The N-PCL defines a not-for-profit corporation as a corporation
"(1) formed . . . exclusively for a purpose or purposes, not for pecuniary profit or financial gain, . . . and (2) no part of the assets, income
or profits of which is distributable to, or enures to the benefit of, its
members, directors or officers except to the extent permitted under
this statute." 9 1 Thus, a not-for-profit corporation must have a not-

85

N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAw § 65 (McKinney Supp. 1980).

86 Id.

V The N-PCL is divided into 14 articles. The first 13 articles deal with the same subject
matter as the corresponding articles of the BCL. The drafters borrowed the substance and
language of the BCL where appropriate. See, e.g., N-PCL, supra note 8, § 619 (adopts verbatim
language of BCL § 620(a) concerning voting agreements).
8 See, e.g., N-PCL, supra note 8, § 202 (substantially adopts BCL provision regarding
corporate powers, with modification to accommodate nonprofit purposes). SeeJoINT COMMITTEE MEMORANDA, supra note 76, at xii.

89 See, e.g., N-PCL, supra note 8, § 102(a)(6) (borrowing definition of director from N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 102(a)(5) (McKinney 1963)).
9 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
0' N-PCL, supra note 8, § 102(a)(5).
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for-profit purpose or purposes 92 and no flow-through of assets or
income to its members, directors, or officers.9" The N-PCL divides
not-for-profit corporations into four types-A, B, C, and D- 94 reflecting the different purposes of nonprofit corporations. This classification scheme 9 5 permits separate statutory treatment as necessitated
by considerations of public policy.
To accommodate the special needs of certain kinds of not-forprofit corporations, the last article of the N-PCL pertains to eleven
specified subtypes. 96 The N-PCL consolidated these provisions from
the superseded Membership Corporations Law9" without change in
form or substance. 98 The N-PCL thus strives to recognize the diversity of nonprofit corporations through its classification scheme. It is

92

See

JOINT COMMITTEE MEMORANDA,

supra note 76, at x. Section 204 of the N-PCL,

however, permits activities that result in financial gain to the corporation so long as the
corporation uses such profits to further its valid nonprofit purpose.
93 Members of not-for-profit corporations may, however, receive certain assets of the
corporation upon dissolution. See N-PCL, supra note 8, § 1005(a)(3)(B), (b)(3). See notes 169-72
and accompanying text infra.
94 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 201.
95 Section 201(b) provides:
A corporation, of a type and for a purpose or purposes as follows, may be
formed under this chapter, provided consents required under any other statute of
this state have been obtained:
Type A-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for any
lawful non-business purpose or purposes including, but not limited to, any one or
more of the following non-pecuniary purposes: civic, patriotic, political, social,
fraternal, athletic, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and for a professional, commercial, industrial, trade or service association.
Type B-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for any one
or more of the following non-business purposes: charitable, educational, religious,
scientific, literary, cultural or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
Type C-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for any
lawful business purpose to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objective.
Type D-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed under this
chapter when such formation is authorized by any other corporate law of this state
for any business or non-business, or pecuniary or non-pecuniary, purpose or
purposes specified by such other law, whether such purpose or purposes are also
within types A, B, C above or otherwise.
Id. Corporations must file a certificate of type with the Secretary of State. Id. § 113. The Type
A corporation resembles California's mutual benefit corporation; the Type B corporation
resembles California's public benefit and religious corporations. See notes 241-45 and accompanying text infra.
91 N-PCL, supra note 8, §§ 1401-1411 (cemetery corporations, fire corporations, corporations for the prevention of cruelty, Christian associations, soldiers' monument corporations,
medical societies, alumni corporations, historical societies, agricultural and horticultural corporations, boards of trade/chamber of commerce, and local development corporations).
97 N.Y. MEME. CORP. LAW §§ 1-236 (McKinney 1941 & Supp. 1962).
98 JOINT COMMITTEE MEMORANDA, supra note 76, at xxvii.
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difficult to evaluate the efficacy of the scheme, however, because the
N-PCL covers all types of not-for-profit corporations in one statute. 9
C. Superviso7y Features
The N-PCL retains the requirements of judicial and administrative approval previously contained in the Membership Corporations
Law.' 0 0 The N-PCL consolidates all such consents, except that judicial approval is no longer required for the formation of mutual benefit
corporations (Type A). 10 1
The role of judicial approval in the formation of not-for-profit
corporations is questionable. The judge presumably evaluates the
community's need for the corporation, but perhaps this is not a
proper judicial function. The law provides for ample supervision
during formation without judicial approval.10 2 Furthermore, the new
statute includes reporting requirements 10 3 and grants the Attorney
General supervisory powers 10 4 to assure continuous supervision of
not-for-profit corporations. The judicial approval provision is burdensome and probably results in more supervision than the ideal formulation requires.

" For a discussion of the California method, which employs separate statutes, see notes
241-45 and accompanying text infra.
100 The New York Membership Corporations Law contained an array of judicial and
administrative approval and consent requirements regarding the formation of membership
corporations. A nonprofit corporation whose mission was to provide services, or solicit contributions for such purpose, in areas subject to state regulation, was required to obtain two
approvals. It first needed the approval of a justice of the state supreme court in the appropriate
district. It was then necessary, to obtain approval from the appropriate state or local agency or
body, such as the public health council in cases involving hospitals. See N.Y. MEMB. CORP.
LAw §§ 10, 11 (McKinney 1941) (repealed 1970); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw § 9 (McKinney
1943) (repealed 1973); N.Y. Soc. SRRv. LAw § 460-a (McKinney Supp. 1980).
101 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 404(a). See also id. § 970 (requiring judicial approval of certain
mergers).
o The administrative bodies in the substantive field of the corporate applicant are surely in
a better position to evaluate the need for additional corporations in the field. The required
filings with the Secretary of State assure that the corporation observes all formalities. See id. §§
401-405.
103 The N-PCL provides that a corporation for which state money has been appropriated
must have on file with the state comptroller a report stating its purposes, financial condition,
and operations before state funds can be disbursed. Id. § 518. The law further requires the
board of directors of all corporations to issue a comprehensive annual report to members
containing detailed financial, operational, and membership information. Id. § 519.
104 See, e.g., id. § 720 (detailing actions by Attorney General). See notes 153-54 and accompanying text infra. The N-PCL also grants justices of the state supreme courts visitatorial power
to inspect Type B and Type C corporations. N-PCL, supra note 8, § 114.
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D. Members and Member Voting
Not-for-profit corporations may have one or more classes of
members as provided for in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws. 10 5 A corporation formed for charitable purposes (Type B) need
106
not have any members.
The Membership Corporations Law required a quorum of onethird of the membership to transact business at a meeting.10 7 The
new law states that the basic quorum requirement is the number of
members "entitled to cast a majority of the total number of votes
entitled to be cast thereat . ... 1,0" The certificate of incorporation
or bylaws may, however, provide for a smaller quorum of not less
than the number of members entitled to cast one hundred votes or ten
percent of the votes entitled to be cast, whichever is less.1 0 9
The N-PCL requires a plurality vote to elect directors and a
majority vote to transact other business." x0 The certificate of incorporation or bylaws, however, may require a greater vote"' than otherwise required to transact any business or a specified item of business. 1' 2 Amendments to the certificate of incorporation or bylaws
that relate to greater-than-normal quorum or voting requirements
require a vote of two-thirds of the members entitled to vote thereon,
or such greater proportion as may be prescribed specifically by the
certificate or bylaws." 3 Members may cast their votes pursuant to
4
signed voting agreements.1

105 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 601(a).
108 Id. This recognizes the existence of charitable foundations that have no membership and

are run by a self-perpetuating board of directors. SeeJOINT COMMIrEE MFMORANDA, supra note
76, at xvi.
107 N.Y. MEMB. CORP. LAW § 20 (McKinney 1941) (repealed 1970).
10' N-PCL, supra note 8, § 608(a).
10" Id. § 608(b). The 100-vote quorum accommodates the very large membership corporations whose members may not be interested in attending meetings. The N-PCL also provides
for action by members without a meeting by unanimous written consent. Id. § 614.
110 Id. § 613.
I Id. § 615(a)(1).
110 Id. § 615(a)(2).
113 Id. § 615(b). The certificate of incorporation or bylaws also may provide for class voting.
Id. § 616. See also id. § 709 (greater-than-normal quorum and voting applicable to directors'
meetings).
14 Id. § 619. When combined with an irrevocable proxy, members may utilize a self-enforceable pooling arrangement. Section 609(a)(6)(E) authorizes irrevocable proxies in connection with voting agreements. These provisions obviate the need for voting trusts; thus the
statute does not authorize them. See id. § 619, LEOISLATiV- STUDIES AND REPORTS at 229
(McKinney 1970).
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E. Board of Directors
One aim of the N-PCL was to promote strong boards of directors
in not-for-profit corporations." 5 The certificate of incorporation or
bylaws may provide for the election or appointment of alternate directors, who may then exercise the rights of absent directors at board
meetings." 6 This provision is preferable to proxy voting by directors
because the alternate director can better represent his constituency by
7
attendance at board meetings."
A majority of directors generally constitutes a quorum for transacting business." 8 The board generally may act by a majority vote of
the directors present at the meeting," 9 but the statute also authorizes
greater-than-normal quorum and voting requirements. 120
Although the N-PCL was purportedly to promote a strong board
of directors, it allows sterilization of the board by stipulation in the
certificate of incorporation. 21' In addition, the statute permits delegation of the board's authority to executive committees with certain
specific exceptions 122
The N-PCL provisions regarding members' and directors' roles
in managing the not-for-profit corporation are both comprehensive
and flexible. The norm is majority rule and management by the board
of directors, but the flexible quorum requirements and sterilization
option allow for a more active membership role in running the corporation whenever permissible or desirable.
F. Corporate Finance
Not-for-profit corporations in New York, as elsewhere, are financed by a variety of sources, including the government, the business community, the public, and membership fees. A modern nonprofit corporation statute must allow flexible methods of financing
while preventing abuse of the nonprofit form.

1'

SeeJoINT COMMITTEE

MEMORANDA,

supra note 76, at xviii. See also N-PCL, supra note 8, §

701 (vesting management authority in board of directors).
116 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 703.
117 See notes 212-13 and accompanying text infra.
n8 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 707.
Id. § 708(d).
Id. § 709.
121 "Except as otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, a corporation shall be
"o

120

managed by its board of directors." Id. § 701(a). If the certificate of incorporation vests
management authority in non-board members, such persons are subject to the same liabilities
as are directors. Id. § 701(b).
122

Id. § 712.
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Under the N-PCL, not-for-profit corporations may not issue
shares or certificates therefor. 12 3 Members may make capital contributions of money, property, or services, but not of promises of future
services or payments. 12 4 Capital contributions are redeemable only
upon dissolution, or, if specified in the certificate of incorporation, at
the option of the corporation for a specified amount not to exceed the
12 5
initial capital contribution.
The subvention, a new method of financing not-for-profit corporations, resembles a debt agreement. The certificate of incorporation
may authorize the board of directors to accept subventions by resolution and issue certificates therefor. 26 Subventions may be accepted
from both members and nonmembers, and must consist of money or
property actually received or expended for the corporation's benefit. l127 The board resolution would set a fixed or contingent "periodic
payment" from corporate assets-quasi-interest- at a percentage of
the original subvention value, not to exceed two-thirds of the maximum interest rate allowed under the usury law. 128 The board resolution may provide for whole or partial redemption of subventions at
any price not to exceed the original value of the subvention plus
accrued periodic payments.12 9 The resolution also may grant subvention holders the right to require redemption after a designated period
or upon occurrence of a specified contingency, such as nonpayment of
the periodic payment for a specified time, provided such redemption
would not impair the corporation's operations or injure its other
creditors. 3 Claims of subvention holders are subordinated to claims
of creditors upon dissolution of the corporation.' 3 '
Although flexible financing provisions are desirable, the utility of
the subvention remains to be seen. Conventional debt, capital contribution, and charitable contribution procedures probably can achieve
similar results. 132

123 Id.
124 Id.

§ 801.
§ 502(a), (b), (c).

125 Id. § 502(e).

126Id.

§ 504.

129Id.
130Id.

§ 504(e).
§ 504(f). Thus, the

127 Id. § 504(b).
128Id. § 504(d).

board may give the subvention certain characteristics of preferred

shares.
131Id. § 504(g).
132 See id. §§ 502, 506, 513.
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G. Donated Funds
133 govCorporation law principles, rather than trust principles,
ern the administration of funds donated for specific charitable purposes. 3 4 Assets donated to not-for-profit corporations become the
property of the corporation even if transferred by a trust instrument. 135 The donation does not create an express trust. 136 The
board of directors, however, must apply the assets received to the
purposes specified in the gift instrument and follow specific instructions as to the administration of the assets.1 37 Because the law authorizes virtually all otherwise lawful investments, 38 directors are afforded wide latitude in the administration and investment of donated
funds.
Upon dissolution, the not-for-profit corporation must distribute
those assets held for a specific purpose to another organization with
similar purposes.1 3' The N-PCL thus effectuates the presumed intent
of the donor while allowing flexibility in the administration of donated
40
funds.'

H. Duties and Liabilities of Directors and Officers
The ideal nonprofit corporation statute should provide comprehensive treatment of directors' and officers' duties and liabilities,
thereby facilitating internal stewardship by members and directors.
Although some statutes leave this area to judicial development, 141 the

See OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5, at 763-64.
See N-PCL, supra note 8, § 513, LEGISLATIVE STUDIES AND REPORTS at 162.
135 Id. § 513(a). This is always true of Type B corporations (charitable, educational,
religious, scientific, literary, cultural or prevention of cruelty purposes). With regard to other
not-for-profit corporations, this section may be superseded by law or by amendment to the
certificate of incorporation. Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. § 513(b). In addition, if a gift donated for a specific purpose consists of appreciable
property, the board may expend any appreciation thereof for the prescribed purposes, unless
prohibited by the donor in the gift instrument. Id. § 513(c), (d).
138 Id. § 512. Of course, the powers of directors are always subject to the duty of care
requirements of the statute. See notes 142-45 and accompanying text infra.
139 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 1005(a)(3)(A). For a discussion of dissolution priorities, see notes
169-72 and accompanying text infra.
140 The N-PCL codifies the cy pres doctrine. See id. § 1005, LEGISLATIVE STUDIES AND
REPORTS at 426. The cy pres doctrine requires that the presumed intent of the donor control
distribution of donated funds upon dissolution, rather than allowing distribution to the state or
members. Under the doctrine, the organization holds the assets in trust for specific purposes.
The transfer of the assets to a corporation with similar purposes is thus consistent with the
trustee's duty under the gift. See Henn & Pfeifer, Nonprofit Groups: Factors Influencing Choice of
Form, 11 WARE FOREST L. REv. 181, 199 (1975).
141 See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT (1964).
133

134

1122

CORNELL LAW RE VIEW

[Vol.66:1103

N-PCL sets forth a detailed statutory scheme. Directors and officers
must adhere to the "prudent director" standard: "Directors and
officers shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good
faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions." 1 42 Directors and officers may rely in good faith on financial
in charge
statements represented as correct by the president or officer
143
of the accounts or by reports of independent auditors.
The N-PCL's prudent director standard resembles that contained in the BCL. 144 Legislative studies of the N-PCL reveal the
intent to create a duty "flexible enough to meet the many differing
circumstances of the various types of non-profit corporations." 45
Directors voting for or concurring in certain proscribed corporate
actions are jointly and severally liable to the corporation. 146 Such
proscribed actions include improper distributions, 147 periodic payments or redemptions with respect to outstanding subventions,1 48 and
loans . 14 Directors held liable for such violations may obtain contribution from other directors who have voted for or concurred in the
action.' 50 Directors who are sued may avoid liability by proving that
they discharged their statutory duties.' 5 '

142 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 717(a).
143 Id. § 717(b).
144 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1980). The legislature amended the BCL
provision in 1977 to apply only to directors and to expand and particularize the reliance
defense. See id. Officers are held to a good faith standard. Id. § 715(h).
145 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 717, LEGISLATIVE STUDIES AND REPORTS at 297. The N-PCL does

not explicitly state to whom the director owes the duty, but does provide an action for violation
of the duty. See notes 152-64 and accompanying text infra.
The "prudent person" test, which requires the director or officer to exercise the degree of
care a prudent person would exercise in the management of his own affairs, is far more rigid.
For a discussion of the difference between the prudent person test and the prudent director test,
see Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966), wherein the
court applied the prudent person test under a 1933 Pennsylvania statute. The Pennsylvania
statute was amended in 1968 to adopt the prudent director standard. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §
1408 (Purdon 1981). For a discussion of the "trustee" standard, see notes 203-11 and
accompanying text infra.
146 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 719(a).
147 Id. § 719(a)(1).
148 Id. § 719(a)(2), (3).
149 Id. § 719(a)(5). Section 716 prohibits corporate loans to directors and officers of the
corporation or to organizations or entities in which a director or officer has a substantial
financial interest. This prohibition does not include loans made through purchase of bonds or
debentures customarily sold in public offerings, or through deposit of funds in a bank.
Directors or officers participating in or authorizing a proscribed loan violate their statutory
duties, but the borrower must still repay the obligation.
Id. § 719(c).
'5
1 Id. § 719(e).
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The statute also authorizes specific remedies for certain director
and officer misconduct. 152 The attorney general, the corporation,
judgment creditors, and various other parties 53 may bring an action
against directors and officers for statutory violations. 154 The N-PCL
expressly authorizes indemnification of officers, directors, and other
personnel1 55 and empowers the corporation to purchase insurance
56
covering possible indemnification.1
I. Member Derivative Actions
Five percent or more of any class of members, holders of capital
certificates, or owners of a beneficial interest therein may bring an
action in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation to procure a
judgment in the corporation's favor.' 57 The plaintiff must be a member, holder, or owner when the complaint is filed. 158 The complaint
must set forth with particularity prior efforts by the plaintiff to secure
the initiation of the action by the board of directors, or reasons for not
having made such efforts.' 5 9 Analogous New York case law probably
would bar the derivative action if a disinterested quorum or committee of directors exercises its business judgment and determines that

152 Id. § 720, authorizes actions

(1) To compel accounting regarding director or officer failure to perform
duties in the management and disposition of corporate assets, or for waste or
conversion of assets;
(2) To set aside the unlawful conveyance, transfer, or assignment of assets
where the transferee knew of its unlawfulness;
(3) To enjoin the proposed unlawful conveyance, transfer, or assignment of
assets.
's'Id. § 720(b), (c).
,24See notes 146-51 and accompanying text supra.
' Id. §§ 721-726, 202(a)(12).
'r Id. § 727.
'5
Id. § 623(a). The N-PCL adopted the five percent rule in lieu of the BCL provision
requiring security for expenses in derivative actions. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1963).
I'sN-PCL, supra note 8, § 623(b). The N-PCL dropped the BCL's contemporaneous share
ownership requirement because the five percent rule makes it unlikely that an interest would be
acquired solely to initiate a derivative action. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney
1963); N-PCL, supra note 8, § 623(b), LEGISLATIVE STUDiES AND REPORTS at 237.
159See N-PCL, supra note 8, § 623(c). The N-PCL does not provide for demand on
members. The demand rule regarding the board is similar to that contained in the BCL, and
cases interpreting the BCL may apply by analogy. See Woodley v. Butler, 101 Misc. 2d 670,
673, 421 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (Sup. Ct. 1979), appealdismissed, 75 A.D.2d 756, 428 N.Y.S.2d
999 (1980). Demand might be unnecessary if plaintiff shows, for example, that the demand
would be futile because the complaint implicates a majority of the board.
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of the action is against the best interests of the
the maintenance
0
6

corporation.1

A derivative action cannot be discontinued, compromised, or
settled without court approval.1 61 Proceeds from such actions accrue
to the corporation after deduction of any court award to the plaintiffs
or claimants of reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees.' 6 2
The five percent rule is an overly burdensome prerequisite for the
initiation of member derivative actions. 16 3 In conjunction with the
business judgment rule embodied in the demand requirement, 6 4 the
five percent rule is likely to stifle many meritorious actions.

J. Merger and Consolidation of Not-for-Profit Corporations with Business
Corporations
In addition to its broad authorization of mergers and consolidations between not-for-profit corporations, 16 5 the N-PCL permits merger or consolidation of domestic or foreign mutual benefit or public
purpose not-for-profit corporations (Type A and Type C) with domestic or foreign business corporations. 166 Given the complexity of the
provision, 6 7 it may be preferable to require dissolution when a notfor-profit corporation seeks to change its purpose from nonprofit to
profit. 168
4160See Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 600 (1980). In the context of nonprofit corporations, the rule would be more aptly termed
the "best judgment rule."
161 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 623(d).
162 Id. § 623(e). Proceeds of a judgment rendered solely for the compensation of injured
members or beneficial owners, however, accrue to such members or owners and are limited to
actual losses. Id.
163 See notes 267-79 and accompanying text infra (discussion of the preferable California
rule).
14 See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
165 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 901. Mergers and consolidations involving a Type B or Type C

constituent corporation require judicial approval. Id. § 907.
166 Id. § 908.
16I In addition to the general procedures set forth in § 902, the merger or consolidation must
be consistent with New York law as well as the law of any other jurisdiction in which a
constituent corporation is incorporated. Id. § 908(a). The plan of merger must explicitly
describe the method of converting members' interests into shares, bonds, or securities of the
surviving or consolidated corporation. Id. § 908(c). The plan must also specify the cash or
consideration to be paid for shares or other interests of members in any constituent corporation. Id. Pursuant to § 907, judicial approval is required when a constituent corporation is, or
would be if formed under the N-PCL, a public purpose corporation (Type C). Id. § 908(0. If
any constituent or consolidated corporation requires an administrative consent under section
404, the corporation must obtain such consent before filing the certificate of merger. Id. § 909.
166 Cf notes 226-28 and accompanying text infra (discussion of applicable OLECK DRAF'r
provisions). Specific legislation could permit urban development not-for-profit corporations to
become business corporations and thus satisfy the apparently narrow goal of the provision. See
N-PCL, supra note 8, § 908, LEGISLATIVE STUDIES AND REPORTS at 417.
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K. Dissolution
Creditors enjoy priority in both judicial and nonjudicial dissolutions of not-for-profit corporations. 169 The dissolving corporation
must distribute assets held for a Type B charitable purpose to a
domestic or foreign corporation with similar purposes.1 71 Otherwise,
the dissolving corporation must distribute its assets to holders of
subvention certificates, holders of capital certificates, and members,
in that order.' 7 ' Distributions to members upon dissolution are exempt from the general prohibition against distributions of any part of
the income or profit of a not-for-profit corporation to members, directors, or officers.

172

L. Application to Foreign Corporations
A nonprofit corporation statute should regulate foreign nonprofit
corporations that conduct local activities.17 3 Under the N-PCL, a
foreign not-for-profit corporation may not conduct activities in New
York unless authorized.174 Once authorized, a foreign corporation
may conduct any activities that are lawful under both the law of New
York and the law of the jurisdiction of its incorporation. 175 An
unauthorized corporation conducting activities in New York may not
maintain an action in New York until it has been authorized and has
17
paid all accrued taxes, fees, and penalties.
The statutory liabilities of directors and officers of domestic corporations apply equally to directors and officers of foreign corporations
conducting activities in New York.17 7 In addition, certain provisions
governing member derivative actions, exclusive indemnification authority, and mergers or consolidations apply to foreign corporations. 178 Certain authorized foreign corporations conducting most of
169 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 1005(a)(3).
170

Id. § 1005(a)(3)(A).

Id. § 1005(b). See id. §§ 504(c), 502(e).
I7 Id. § 102(a)(5).
173 See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
174 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 1301(a). See id. §§ 1304, 1305 for authorization procedures.
175 Id. § 1301(a). ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 99 (1966 version) (now § 106) greatly
'7

influenced the drafters of the N-PCL. Both statutes contain a list of activities not constituting

the "conduct of activities." See N-PCL, supra note 8, § 1301, LEGISLATIVE STUDIES AND
at 554.
178 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 1313(a). An unauthorized corporation may, however, defend any
action brought against it in New York. Id. § 1313(b).
177 Id. § 1318. Directors and officers are liable for substantive statutory violations under §
719 (except § 719(a)(4)) and misconduct under § 720. Id. See notes 142-52 and accompanying
text supra.
178 N-PCL, supra note 8, § 1320, referring to § 623 (derivative actions), §§ 721-27 (indemnification), and § 906 (merger or consolidation).

REPORTS
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however, from the
their activities outside New York are exempt,
79
above.'
outlined
requirements
substantive
The N-PCL thus assimilates many foreign nonprofit corporations
by subjecting them to the substantive statutory provisions applicable
to domestic corporations. This permits more meaningful regulation
and is far more effective than a simple qualification requirement.'" °
M. Summary
The New York N-PCL approaches the ideal in the areas of
classification, governmental supervision, membership role, duties and
liabilities of directors and officers, and qualification and assimilation
of foreign nonprofit corporations. Improvements can be made, however, by further differentiating the types of corporations, deleting
judicial approval requirements, relaxing the limitations on member
derivative actions, and disallowing mergers or consolidations converting nonprofit corporations into business corporations.
VII
OLECK DRAFT OF PROPOSED UNIFORM NONPROFIT

ORGANIZATIONS ACT

(1980

REvISION)

A. Statutory Structure
Dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the ABA Model Non-Profit
Corporation Act inspired Professor Oleck's proposed uniform NonThe Oleck Draft, howprofit Organizations Act (Oleck Draft)."8
ever, was intended neither to be comprehensive in coverage nor to
compete with the ABA's formulation. Rather, Professor Oleck offered

179

Section 1321 of the N-PCL exempts the following corporations:

(1) Type A corporations where their principal activities, the greater part of
their property, and two thirds of their members are located outside the state;
(2) Type B corporations where their principal activities, the greater part of
their property, and more than 90 percent of their revenue is derived from outside
the state;
(3) Type C corporations where their principal activities, the greater part of
their property, and more than 50 percent of their revenue over the last three years
originated from outside the state.
180 See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
181 OLECK DRAFTr, supra note 5, at 1187-1221. Professor Oleck, for example, disapproves of
the ABA-ALI Model Non-Profit Corporation Act's failure to include adequate provision for
governmental supervision. Id. at 1189. The Model Act left governmental supervision to other
statutes. See note 41 supra. For a discussion of the Model Act, see notes 33-55 and accompanying text supra.
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his draft as an alternative to certain provisions contained in the Model
Act.182

The Oleck Draft rests on the premise that nonprofit organizations spring from voluntarism and are therefore fundamentally different from business organizations "though they can benefit from the
laws and procedures developed for and by the latter." 1 8 3 A paramount drafting concern was to provide for reasonable supervision by
the public authorities that grant privileges and support to nonprofit
organizations, on the ground that all nonprofit organizations are
1 s4
affected with a public interest.
B. Application to UnincorporatedAssociations
The Oleck Draft applies to unincorporated associations as well as
corporations.18 5 It characterizes unincorporated nonprofit associations as "partnerships not-for-profit" 186 and requires such partnerships to file their articles of association with the state licensing commission. 8s7 The Oleck Draft, however, requires all nonprofit
organizations to incorporate with the exception of those non-"public
benefit" organizations having fewer than seven members that operate
within a single county. 88
Although good reasons exist for applying the Oleck Draft to
unincorporated groups,' 8 9 the proposed methodology raises more
questions than it answers. First, unincorporated nonprofit organizations are deemed partnerships not-for-profit. Yet all of the states
except Georgia and Louisiana have adopted the Uniform Partnership
Act, 90 which defines a partnership as an association of two or more
persons carrying on business for profit.' 9 ' This definition is the
supra note 5, at 1189.
Id.
4 See id.; id. §4(b), at 1191.
I'n Id. § 3, at 1191. Unincorporated organizations would also be subject to all general and
182 OLECK DRAFT,
183

special corporation and association statutes of the state, except where inconsistent with the

Oleck Draft. Id.

§

4(a), at 1191.

186 Id.

§

10, at 1193.

187 Id.

§

12, at 1193. The licensing commission is discussed at notes 214-20 and accompany-

ing text infra.
188 OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5, § 6, at 1191-92.
189 As a general proposition, it makes sense to draft the proposed act to apply to unincorporated nonprofit associations. Surely some statutory provisions addressing problems of public
benefit groups should apply to both incorporated and unincorporated groups. For example, a
formulation of the cy pres doctrine might apply upon dissolution of any public benefit organization. See notes 133-40 and accompanying text supra.
180 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 1-45.
"I Id. § 6(1). Georgia and Louisiana define partnership in similar terms. G1. CODE ANN. §
75-101 (West 1935); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2801 (West Supp. 1981).
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cornerstone of modern partnership law. The Oleck Draft's imposition, in a single provision, of a complex business-for-profit statute
accompanied by decades of judicial gloss, upon all types of unincorpo192
rated nonprofit groups boggles the mind.
Second, the requirement that all nonprofit organizations incorporate, 193 save for small, local membership groups, is also questionable.
This provision would increase costs for many unincorporated groups.
The rule presumably is designed to subject these groups to the regulations applicable to corporations. Indeed, the substantive provisions of
the Oleck Draft are addressed primarily to corporations, with occasional reference to "organizations" or "associations." The Draft
might instead have included a special chapter containing substantive
and supervisory provisions applicable only to unincorporated groups.
Such a scheme could have accommodated the problems germane to
unincorporated associations, preserved flexibility in choice of form of
nonprofit organization, and reduced costs for the smaller associations
that might have wished to avoid incorporation.
C. Recognition of Nonprofit Diversity; Duration;Members
The Oleck Draft's principal classification scheme distinguishes
between organizations not for pecuniary profit and organizations that
benefit the general public through charitable work. 9 4 Corporate
purposes and activities may not confer direct o indirect pecuniary
profit to members or officers, other than reasonable compensation for
work or services performed in their capacities as agents or employees.195

Duration is perpetual unless the articles of incorporation or association or another statute specifies a shorter period.' a "Charitable
organizations" and "charitable trusts (foundations)" have twentyfive year 9 7 and ten year maximum durations, respectively, unless the
licensing commission approves a longer term.'9

...Indeed, having a business association statute apply to a nonprofit association is inconsistent with Professor Oleck's basic approach. The Oleck Draft also includes a questionable
provision that deems organizers and promoters of nonprofit corporations joint venturers until
the filing of the certificate of incorporation. OLECK DP.AFr, supra note 5, § 16, at 1193.
Principles of agency law might be better suited to control the activities of organizers and
promoters.
o See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
'9

OLECK DRAFr, supra note 5.

'9

Id. § 1, at 1190.

196 Id. § 13, at 1193.

9 Id. § 14, at 1193.
1 Id. § 15, at 1193.
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Membership provisions are flexible, permitting organizations
with no members as well as those with institutional members.' 9 9 If an
organization has no members, its directors are "taken to be mem20 1
bers. '

20 0

Quorum and voting requirements are left to the bylaws,

and proxy voting by members is permitted unless otherwise provided
in the articles of incorporation or bylaws. 0 2
D. Board of Directors
The Oleck Draft gives directors "the status of trustees except as
that status is limited by law, the charter, or bylaws."12 0 3 Management authority is vested in the board of directors, 20 4 and "fundamental changes in corporate purposes or methods" require decision by the
general membership. 20 5 Although executive or other committees are
authorized, 20 ' directors may not abdicate their authority to anyone. 207 They may, however, vote by proxy on simple matters requiring either a yes or no vote.20 8 The board must present a detailed
meeting and file this report with the licensing
report at the annual
20 9
commission.
The trustee status of directors raises many questions, notwithstanding the public interest in nonprofit organizations. Under the
trust concept, legal title to the assets vests in the trustees, and the
equitable interests vest in passive beneficiaries. This division of interests in assets is inconsistent with the corporate form and generates
unnecessary complications and confusion. 210 More important, the
trustee standard is excessively demanding for most directors of nonprofit organizations. Trustees are subject to the highest standards of

199

See id. §§ 37, 39, at 1200.

200 Id. § 37, at 1200. Directors in organizations with no members must distinguish between

acting qua directors and acting qua members. Directors could bring derivative actions if the
state allowed equitable member derivative actions.
201 Id. § 43(d), at 1201.
202 Id. § 43(a), at 1201.
203 Id. § 57, at 1206.
204Id. § 63, at 1206.
205

Id.

Id. § 69(a), at 1209.
Id. § 58, at 1206.
208 Id. § 50, at 1205.
209Id. § 64(a), at 1206-07. The Oleck Draft requires a verified report containing detailed
financial, operational, and membership information.
210 Moreover, the trust concept perpetuates outdated decisional law applying trust principles
to nonprofit corporations. This would continue the confusion that resulted from the application
of inconsistent legal principles to nonprofit corporations. See notes 11-13 and accompanying
text supra.
206
207
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care and fiduciary conduct. Directors of nonprofit organizations often
have other full-time positions and perform their directors' duties as an
avocational community service. Subjecting them to the trustee standard might discourage such service. Of course, directors should have a
duty of care, but the "prudent director" test is more realistic and
more flexible than the trustee standard. 2 1 ' The trustee concept is a
vestige of the law of charitable trusts and is inappropriate for nonprofit corporations.
The prohibition of a director's abdication of authority should be
assessed in view of the authorization of executive and other committees and director voting by proxy, both of which reduce the impact of
the nonabdication rule. Proxy voting by directors is questionable.
Directors are supposed to attend meetings and exercise their collective
judgment in the best interests of the organization.2 12 The Oleck
Draft recognizes this by requiring meetings and by allowing proxy
voting only on "specific questions calling for a simple affirmative or
negative vote."12 1 3

In the final analysis, however, even the most

complicated resolutions can be phrased to require a yes or no vote.
E. Supervisory Features
The Oleck Draft provides for a five person licensing commission
whose members are appointed by the governor for staggered five year
terms. 4 The commission must include "one member of the political
party other than that to which the Governor belongs," a woman, a
trained sociologist, and a member of the bar. 2 5 The commission is
charged with regulating nonprofit organizations, including the examination and approval of every certificate of incorporation and amendment thereto.2 16 The commission is also responsible for supervising
special activities of nonprofit organizations "affected with a direct
public interest," ' 21 7 authorizing all solicitations of public support,
licensing solicitors, and promulgating rules to effectuate these pur2 8

poses. 9
211

See notes 142-45 and accompanying text supra. The Oleck Draft also prohibits transac-

tions in which a director is interested unless authorized by the certificate of incorporation,
bylaws, or a two-thirds vote of the board of directors. OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5, § 64(b), at
1207.
212 For a discussion of New York's alternate director approach, see notes 115-17 and
accompanying text supra.
213 OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5, § 50, at 1205.
214 Id. § 7(a), at 1192.
215 Id.

218 Id. § 7(b), at 1192. The Oleck Draft also contains some unnecessary, anachronistic
boilerplate requirements for incorporation. For example, the provision that requires five
incorporators to form a corporation. See id. § 27(a), at 1198.
217 Id. § 7(c), at 1192.

218 Id. § 7(d), (e), at 1192.
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One may well question the superimposition of a licensing commission on the current administrative and judicial framework. 2 19 Perhaps greater consideration should be given to setting forth statutory
standards of conduct and relying on judicial visitatorial powers, Attorney General intervention, and self-regulation by members and direc22 0

tors.

Adhering to his premise,2 21 Professor Oleck has included ample
provision for judicial and administrative supervision of nonprofit organizations. The licensing commission has overseer functions that
continue from incorporation to dissolution. 222 Other provisions for
judicial and administrative supervision,2 2 3 combined with the disclosure and reporting requirements, 2 4 allow for comprehensive supervision of the activities of nonprofit organizations. 25
F. Prohibitionof Charitable Corporation'sBecoming NoncharitableCorporation
The Oleck Draft, while permitting mergers and consolidations
between nonprofit corporations and amendments to corporate charters, 2 6 properly prohibits a charitable corporation from amending its
227 If
articles of incorporation to become a noncharitable corporation.
a charitable corporation desires to change its basic purpose, it should

219

The commission might contribute expertise and diverse views to the supervision of

nonprofit corporations. This is the apparent intent of the provision requiring the governor to
appoint diverse types of individuals to the commission. See note 215 and accompanying text
supra. It is doubtful, however, that a five member commission would possess expertise in all or
even most of the fields in which nonprofit organizations operate. Where administrative approval is required for incorporation, the licensing commission's work largely will duplicate the
efforts of state agencies. Clearly, the state agencies involved will possess more expertise and
thus will be better suited to supervise nonprofit corporations in their substantive fields.
Moreover, the Office of the Secretary of State can monitor nonprofit corporate formalities just
as it does with business corporations. See, e.g., OLaCK DRAFT, supra note 5, § 27(a), at 1198
(requires filing of articles of incorporation with Secretary of State).
220 The commission might be able to supervise membership organizations to protect the
rights and investments of members. Surely, however, comprehensive provision for director and
officer liability coupled with a provision allowing member derivative actions would accomplish
the same end. See notes 141-64 and accompanying text supra. The latter course avoids the cost
of an expanded bureaucracy. Moreover, the process is familiar to the courts and legislatures
because of their experience with similar business corporation statutes.
221 See notes 183-84 and accompanying text supra.
222 OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5, §§ 7, 87, at 1192, 1216.
See id. § 90, at 1219 (Attorney General involuntary dissolution procedure); § 27(d), at
1198-99 (administrative approval requirements for incorporation).
224 See note 209 and accompanying text supra.
22 But see discussion of licensing commission at notes 214-20 and accompanying text supra.
226 OLECK DRAFr, supra note 5, § 78, at 1214-16.
227

Id.
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dissolve, subject to the cy pres provisions, for the protection of2 its
28
donors, creditors, members, beneficiaries, and the general public.
G. Application to Foreign Organizations
The Oleck Draft requires that foreign nonprofit corporations and
associations register with the Secretary of State and obtain approval
22 9
from the licensing commission before commencing local activities.
Failure to register bars the organization from instituting any legal
action in the state, but the organization may cure this incapacity
pursuant to commission rules .230 This approach has the commendable advantage of applying consistent requirements regardless of
whether the organization is incorporated, and whether it is incorporated within or without the state. The Draft, however, requires only
qualification and does not apply to foreign organizations the substan23 1
tive statutory provisions applicable to domestic organizations.
H. Summary
In formulating an ideal nonprofit organization statute, state legislators should consider Professor Oleck's application of substantive
regulation to unincorporated associations. With some modifications,
the Oleck provisions would plug a major gap in current regulatory
schemes. On the other hand, the suggestion that all directors be held
to a trustee standard of care must be considered with caution. Finally,
the licensing commission proposal is probably an example of bureaucratic overkill.
VIII
CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW OF

1980

In many respects, the California Nonprofit Corporation Law
(NCL) 232 approaches the ideal nonprofit corporation statute. Its

22 Id. § 88, at 1218-19. Upon dissolution, net assets (after provision for creditors) are
divided "among the members or persons entitled thereto," except that property legally
required to be used for particular or charitable purposes must be transferred, by court order, to
another corporation or association to be used to best accomplish the general purposes for which
the dissolved corporation was formed or for which the property is legally required to be used.

Id. § 88(e), at 1218-19. But see note 261 and accompanying text infra.
229 0LECK DRAFT, supra note 5, §§ 81, 82, at 1216.
230 Id. § 84, at 1216.
231 For a discussion of the preferable New York rule, see notes 174-80 and accompanying
text supra.
232 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-10,846 (West Supp. 1981).
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drafters made a major effort to fashion legislation that would accommodate the needs of the various types of nonprofit organizations.
233
Because the new law has already spawned much legal comment,
what follows is an abbreviated analysis, highlighting the unique aspects of the statute and comparing it with some of the formulations
previously discussed.
A. Statutory Structure
The California Corporations Code2 34 contains the law applicable
to business corporations (the General Corporation Law), 235 nonprofit
corporations,2

36

23
partnerships,2 3 7 and unincorporated associations. 1

The Nonprofit Corporation Law, which is organizationally similar to
the General Corporation Law (GCL), is a separate, self-contained
statute within the Corporations Code. Although there is little incorporation by reference,2 39 many of the provisions contained in the NCL
2 40
are similar or identical to counterparts contained in the GCL.
B. Recognition of Nonprofit Diversity
The most innovative feature of the NCL is its division of nonprofit corporations by organizational purpose-public benefit,2 41 mutual benefit, 242 and religious.2 43 Although there is similarity among
the parts, specific provisions vary according to the needs of the different types of corporations.
California's classification scheme allows the state to deal more
effectively with the diversity of nonprofit corporations. The separate

233

See OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5; Ellman, supra note 1; Fryer & Haglund, New California

Nonprofit CorporationLaw: A Unique Approach, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1 (1979); Hone, California's
New Nonprofit CorporationLaw-An Introduction and ConceptualBackground, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 733
(1979).
234 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1-35,302 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
-5 Id. §§ 100-2,319.
236 Id. §§ 5,000-10,846.
-7 Id. §§ 15,001-15,700.
-8 Id. §§ 20,000-24,007.
23
But see id. § 6910 (incorporates GCL provisions regarding foreign corporations into NCL
chapter covering public benefit corporations).
240 See, e.g., id. § 7710 (allowing member derivative actions in mutual benefit corporations).
241 Id. § 5060. A public benefit corporation must further a public or charitable purpose. Id. §
5111.
242 Id. § 5059. A mutual benefit corporation can operate for any lawful purpose that does not
contemplate the distribution of gain, profits, or dividends to members, except upon dissolution. Id. § 7110.
243 Id. § 5061. This Article will not consider separately the provisions regarding religious
corporations.
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statutory treatment of religious corporations, for example, accommodates the first amendment problems associated with regulation of
religious institutions. In addition, the separate statutes are easier to
work with than a conglomerate statute with alternative provisions.244
The effectiveness of the scheme ultimately depends on the rationale
and effectiveness of the differences among the statutes of the NCL.2 45
Some of the differences are considered below.
C. Board of Directors
The NCL holds directors of both public benefit and mutual
benefit corporations to the prudent director standard of care.2 46 Arguably, directors of public benefit corporations should be held to a
stricter standard of care than directors of mutual benefit corporations, 4 7 but the prudent director test seems flexible enough to deal
with both types of corporations. 48
The NCL also contains a provision applicable to public benefit
corporations that regulates self-dealing transactions2 49 and is stricter
than its GCL counterpart. Any self-dealing transaction must be (1)
approved by a disinterested majority of the board, (2) fair to the
corporation, (3) for the corporation's benefit, and (4) the most advantageous arrangement reasonably obtainable under the circumstances.2 50 The NCL's strict self-dealing provision for public benefit
corporations supplements the general duty of care imposed upon all

244The classification scheme may raise problems regarding incorporation of mixed purpose
nonprofit corporations. Commentators have suggested the use of a primary purpose test to
classify such corporations. See Fryer & Haglund, supra note 233, at 9. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §
9111 (West Supp. 1981) (applies primary purpose test to religious corporations).
245 An example of differing provisions among the parts of the statute is the definition of the
key term "distribution." As applied to mutual benefit corporations, distribution does not
include the selling or furnishing of goods or services to members. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5049
(West Supp. 1981). Thus, the statute's prohibition of distributions to members, see id. § 5410,
permits normal mutual benefit corporation activities.
246 For a discussion of the prudent director standard, see notes 142-45 and accompanying
text supra.
247 For example, a more demanding standard is arguably necessary for public benefit
corporations because they have no self-interested members to police the board's activities, and
because they involve public interests.
241 See notes 142-45 and accompanying text supra. The NOL preserves the existing case law
regarding duties and liabilities of directors of religious corporations. See CAL. CORP. CODE §
9240 (West Supp. 1981); Fryer & Haglund, supra note 233, at 30.
249 Self-dealing transactions are transactions to which the corporation is a party and in which
one or more directors has a "material financial interest." CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233 (West
Supp. 1981).
220 Id. § 5233(d)(2).
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directors.2 5 1 The NCL subjects the directors of mutual benefit corpo2 52
rations to the same standard imposed by the GCL.

In addition to the self-dealing provision, the NCL restricts the
composition of the board of directors of public benefit corporations.
No more than forty-nine percent of the corporation's board members
may be "interested persons." 2 5 3 "Interested persons" include directors compensated by the corporation for full or part time services
2 54
rendered during the previous twelve months, and their relatives.
This provision is unique and its goal is obvious; however, it
significantly burdens the freedom of public benefit corporations to
choose directors. The NCL already comprehensively regulates selfdealing transactions in public benefit corporations 25 5 and provides for
ample Attorney General supervision. 256 Perhaps composition requirements are better left to articles of incorporation or bylaws.
D. Supervisory Features
The California statute provides for extensive Attorney General
supervision of public benefit corporations. The statute recognizes that
members have no personal interest in such corporations and therefore
have little incentive to monitor the corporation's activities.257 Here,
the California statute properly determines the degree of supervision
according to the type of nonprofit corporation involved. Public benefit
corporations are "subject at all times to examination by the Attorney
General. '2 .58 Voluntary 25 9 and involuntary dissolution 26 0 are also
both subject to such supervision. The NCL also requires that the

2" In addition, the NCL allows boards of directors of all three types of corporations to
delegate authority to committees; however, ultimate responsibility for direction of the corporation's affairs rests with the board. Id. §§ 5210, 7210, 9210. The GCL authorizes full delegation
of authority. See id. § 311. See Fryer & Haglund, supra note 233, at 31.
2 Id. § 7233. See also id. § 310 (GCL provision).
2" CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227(a) (West Supp. 1981).
- Id. § 5227(b)(1), (b)(2). Receiving reasonable compensation for services as a director
does not render one an interested person within the statute. Id.
25 See notes 249-52 and accompanying text supra. See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 6322 (West
Supp. 1981) (requiring annual statement of corporate transactions with interested persons).
There are alternative methods for dealing with an interested board. For example, the Oleck
Draft requires authorization of directors' salaries, as director or officer, by a two-thirds vote of
the board. OLECK DRAFT, supra note 5, § 64(b), at 1207.
2
See notes 257-66 and accompanying text infra.
2
See Hone, supra note 233, at 741.
M CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (West Supp. 1981).
-' See id. § 6611.
2See id. §§ 6510, 6511.

CORNELL LAW RE VIEW

[Vol.66:1103

corporation disclose to the Attorney General information concerning
such extraordinary matters as mergers 261 and transfers of substantially
262
all of the corporation's assets.

Mutual benefit corporations are subject to considerably less supervision because the statute anticipates that an interested membership will exercise vigilance in corporate affairs. 63 The Attorney
General has supervisory powers over such a corporation only with
respect to assets held in charitable trust 2 6' 4 and petitions for involun-

tary dissolution.2 65 In the case of religious corporations, the supervisory power of the Attorney General is defined narrowly to avoid first
2 66
amendment problems.
E. Member Derivative Actions
The NCL adopts derivative action rules similar to those governing business corporations in the GCL. 267 The NCL authorizes members of both public benefit2

6

and mutual benefit corporations2 69 to

bring derivative actions, but retains the GCL's demand requirement,2 70 contemporaneous membership rule,2 7 ' and allowance of defendants' motion to furnish security for litigation expenses2 72 on the
grounds that either the action will not benefit the corporation or its
members 273 or that the moving party, if not the corporation, was
unconnected with the challenged transaction.2 7 4 A court cannot grant
a motion to require security if the action is brought by one hundred
276
members2 76 or some other authorized number thereof.

201 See id. § 6010. The merger of a public benefit corporation with a non-"public benefit"

corporation requires written approval of the Attorney General. Id. § 6010(a). An outright
prohibition of such mergers would be preferable. See notes 226-28 and accompanying text supra.

. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913 (West Supp. 1981).
..3 Cf. note 257 and accompanying text supra.
'" CAL. CORP. CODE § 7240 (West Supp. 1981) (corporation holding assets in charitable
trust subject at all times to examination by Attorney General). See also id. § 8510(e) (dissolution
of corporation holding assets in charitable trust).
285See id. § 8511.
266 Id. § 9230. See Hone, supra note 233, at 743-44.
267 CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1977).

Id. § 5710 (West Supp. 1981).
269Id. § 7710.
2170
Id. §§ 5710(b)(2), 7710(b)(2).
271 Id. §§ 5710(b)(1), 7710(b)(1).
272 "Security" includes reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees as determined by the court.
28

Id. §§ 5710(d), 7710(d).
273 Id. §§ 5710(c)(1), 7710(c)(1).
271 Id. §§ 5710(c)(2), 7710(c)(2).
275 Id. §§ 5710(a), 7710(a).
276 See id. § 5036 (defines authorized number). In corporations without members, directors
have all the rights otherwise vested in members and therefore may bring a derivative action. See
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The NCL strikes a sound balance between the need to allow
member derivative actions and the need to prevent frivolous or strike
suits. The contemporaneous membership requirement and the security provision protect corporations from meritless suits without unnec2 77
essarily discouraging members from asserting meritorious claims.
The NCL formulation is therefore preferable to New York's five
percent requirement,2 78 which can easily discourage plaintiffs with
valid complaints. In addition, the NCL augments its derivative action
provisions by granting members extensive inspection rights,2 7 1 which
allow discovery of misconduct and membership information, thereby
facilitating joinder of enough members to avoid a defendant's motion
for security.
F. Application to Foreign Corporations
California requires foreign nonprofit corporations to qualify before conducting intrastate activities. 28 0 The NCL, however, does not
provide for assimilation of foreign corporations that conduct substantial intrastate activity. 28 ' Although the GCL assimilation provisions
are quite complex,2 8 2 and therefore burdensome, it may be desirable
to apply them to foreign nonprofit corporations that conduct substantial activity in the state.283
G. California, Here We Come!
The California statute, which is the most progressive legislation
of its kind to date, should provide helpful guidance for other states
revising their nonprofit corporation statutes. Above all, its classification scheme provides a framework whereby legislators can, draft a

id. § 5310(b), 7310(b)(2). This method is preferable to the Oleck provision making such
directors "members." See note 200 supra.
277 Business corporation statutes frequently use this technique. See H. HENN, supra note 11,
at 761-86. The California rule is unique in that it allows directors as well as corporate
defendants to move for security-for-expenses. Id. at 781.
278 See notes 157-64 and accompanying text supra.
279 See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6330, 8330 (members' inspection rights), 6333, 8333 (inspection
of accounting books and minutes), 5160, 7160 (inspection of articles of incorporation and
bylaws) (West Supp. 1981).
280 See id. §§ 6910, 8910.
281 The GCL has a comprehensive assimilation provision in its "pseudo foreign corporation" subchapter. See id. §§ 2101-2115 (West 1977). Although the NCL incorporates the GCL
subchapter by reference, it excludes several important assimilation sections. Id. §§ 6910, 8910
(West Supp. 1981).
282 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977).
2'9 See notes 173-80 and accompanying text supra.
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statute that is sensitive to the varying needs of corporations with
fundamentally different purposes and structures. One must, however,
consider the following questions when evaluating the California statute.
First, should the nonprofit statute concern itself with unincorporated groups? For example, the NCL supervisory features applicable
to public benefit corporations might be equally desirable with respect
to unincorporated public benefit associations.28 4 There are no legal
obstacles to such an extension of supervisory power. Moreover, the
application of substantive features of the nonprofit corporation law to
unincorporated groups seems preferable to Professor Oleck's solution
requiring incorporation of all charitable organizations.2 8 5
Second, how closely should the nonprofit corporation law mirror
the business corporation law? Because formalities often serve identical
functions, a degree of similarity is desirable. Beyond formalities the
business corporation law is helpful only if its provisions are suitable to
nonprofit corporations. California's experience with business corporation provisions governing member derivative actions is an example. 2816

Nevertheless, there is good reason to question seriously each

provision of the public benefit corporation law that mirrors its GCL
counterpart because the purposes of the two types of corporations are
so different.- Of course, the mutual benefit corporation's greater similarity to the profit corporation suggests that provisions of the GCL
may be more safely applied to mutual benefit corporation statutes.
Finally, how should the ideal statute provide for adequate governmental supervision without imposing excessive administrative burdens on both the state and the nonprofit corporation? California's
Attorney, General supervision 287 is a good compromise and is preferable to both New York's judicial approval scheme 28 and Professor
Oleck's licensing commission. 289 Nevertheless, the inspection rights
and reporting requirements of the NCL2 0 might prove excessively
burdensome for nonprofit corporations. Attention to these and other
questions will aid state drafters in following the California statute.

214

The fundamental reason to supervise public benefit corporations is their lack of a

vigilant, motivated membership. See note 247 supra. Because this problem also exists for
unincorporated public benefit associations, governmental supervision would be appropriate.
285 See note 193 and accompanying text supra.
26I See notes 267-79 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 257-66 and accompanying text supra.
"I See notes 100-04 and accompanying text supra.
219 See notes 214-25 and accompanying text supra. The licensing commission would not only
increase the state government's budget, but also would increase costs for nonprofit corporations by virtue of the filing requirements.
217

"' See

CAL. CORP. CODE

§§ 6320-6324 (West Supp. 1981) (required records and reports to

directors and members); note 279 supra (inspection rights).
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CONCLUSION-

In the Cinderella story, the glass slipper fits only Cinderella. In
the world of nonprofit organizations, legislators must accommodate a
wide range of human altruistic activity, requiring glass slippers of
various sizes, styles, and lasts for proper fit. Within the proper statutory framework, flexibility will ultimately come from appropriate provisions contained in the articles of incorporation and association, the
bylaws, and the actions of members, directors, and officers.
California, here we come!

